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MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD Vmw. By Thomas Sow-
ell. New York: Basic Books. 1996. Pp. xii, 516. Cloth, $27.50;
paper, $16.
Human beings are constantly on the move. Americans are
probably the most peripatetic people in the industrialized world,
with nearly twenty percent of us each year changing the location of
our homes within the United States.1 Our mobility, however, is
insignificant when compared with the migrations of peoples who
cross the ocean leaving their societies far behind and casting their
lots with new, altogether alien ones.
Intercontinental migrations of this kind, of course, have pro-
ceeded ever since the first communities dispersed by foot across the
globe in search of food, water, land, and security. In migrating,
these groups have transported more than their families and posses-
sions; they have also carried with them their language, art, religion,
values, skills, practices, perspectives, and social institutions - their
unique cultures.
The distinctiveness of these migrant cultures, and the myriad
ways in which they have altered the societies in which they have
been transplanted, are the subjects of Thomas Sowell's stimulating
book. Sowell, an academic economist who has long been a senior
fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, has devoted a long and
distinguished career to exploring these phenomena empirically,
usually relying heavily on the field research of others. In his earlier
works,2 Sowell amassed social science and historical data, much of
it cross-national, to challenge certain assumptions that are wide-
spread among policymaking and intellectual elites as well as much
of the general public. Exhibiting an admirable combination of aca-
demic technique, analytical seriousness, iconoclastic audacity, and
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School; John Marshall Harlan Visiting Profes-
sor, New York Law School (spring term 1997). B.A. 1962, Cornell; J.D. 1965, Harvard;
LL.M. 1966, New York University; M.A. 1969, Harvard. - Ed.
1. See p. 43 n.181 (citing DIANA DFA-Rn, U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, GEOGRAPHICAL
MoBuIIY: MARCH 1990 TO MARCH 1991 (Current Population Reports P20-463, 1992)).
Sowell adds that internal migrations by Americans exceed all migrations by all foreigners to
the U.S. P. 43.
2. His books include ETHNIC AMERICA: A HISTORY (1981), PREFERNTIAL PoLICMs:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990), RACE AN CULTURE: A WORLD Vmw (1994),
and RACE AND ECONOMICS (1975).
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ideological pugnacity, he rejected the credo of universalistic liberals
and egalitarians that humans are really all the same beneath the
surface. Quite the contrary, he insisted, individuals differ from one
another in the most fundamental respects - in how they perceive,
think, value, express themselves, and behave. These differences,
moreover, are most dramatically manifested in their economic per-
formance, which reflects different commitments to a variety of eco-
nomic virtues. These virtues include the propensity to work
incredibly hard at jobs often disdained by the native population,3 be
unusually productive,4 take entrepreneurial risks,5 build strong fam-
ilies and communal institutions, invest in education and other
human capital, practice extreme thrift and self-denial, constantly
innovate, and so on.
Opposing the view of most social reformers, Sowell maintained
that these different commitments do not primarily reflect differ-
ences in the objective conditions that prevail in the larger societies
where the individuals live, such as the level of economic develop-
ment and discriminatory attitudes. Instead, he argued, these differ-
ences in economic and social behavior have almost everything to do
with the individuals' underlying values and practices, which in turn
are shaped by the distinctive cultural patterns of their ethnic and
religious groups. Finally, and most emphatically, Sowell rejected
the notion, cherished by some advocates of multiculturalism, that
because all cultures are different, each of them equally deserves
society's respect and protection, if not nurturance. Instead, he
insisted, some cultures are more economically successful and hence
more worthy of emulation than others - at least if wealth is a
value.6
Ti ANALYnc PRoJEcr
Migrations and Cultures recapitulates these themes of individual
striving, cultural determinism, group differences, and economic
standards of achievement - but it plays them out on a global scale.
Sowell has selected six ethnic groups for special attention:
Germans, Japanese, Italians, Chinese, Jews, and the Indians of
3. This was notably true of the Indians in Africa, p. 316, the Italians in Argentina, pp.
152-53, and the Jewish, Chinese, and Parsee Indian middleman minorities everywhere, pp.
29-32.
4. Sowell notes that Chinese workers on rubber plantations were more than twice as pro-
ductive as their Malay counterparts at the same unskilled jobs. P. 191.
5. For example, Sowell refers to the willingness of immigrant groups to extend credit, on
the basis of refined knowledge and judgment of individuals' ability to repay, to those rejected
by conventional lenders. See eg., pp. 33, 318.
6. He assumes throughout that economic success is praiseworthy in itself and also is con-
ducive to success in other realms, such as politics and high culture. As noted below, he insists
that the causality runs in this direction and not the other way around. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
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south Asia. In their destination countries, large fractions of each of
these groups, albeit to different extents,7 acted as a "middleman
minority," by which Sowell means that its members predominate in
occupations that facilitate the movement of goods and services
from the producer or supplier to the consumer, without necessarily
physically transforming such goods and services. Middleman func-
tions include retailing, wholesaling, moneylending, brokerage, and
the like. Throughout the world, Sowell notes, the economic func-
tions performed by middlemen are widely misunderstood and
underappreciated. The middlemen who perform these functions,
moreover, tend to cultivate different skills and attitudes than the
rest of the population and arouse particularly virulent hostility and
discrimination. As a result, these groups have been obliged to
develop unusually adroit survival skills (pp. 27-35). Migrations and
Cultures is both a catalogue of those skills and an account of how
the six groups have deployed them as minorities in societies across
the globe.
Drawing on an impressive array of secondary sources ranging
widely over time and space, Sowell traces each group's dispersion
around the world and describes the patterns of family, communal
and religious life, occupations, economic activity, political participa-
tion, and institution building that the groups' members have exhib-
ited in the diverse nations and regions in which they have settled.8
All six groups have been economically successful in their desti-
nation countries.9 Indeed, they have usually become more success-
ful than the native populations with whom they had to compete
there, despite daunting initial disadvantages and continuing barri-
ers.'0 Their successes, however, were invariably hard won and took
7. Sowell is not too clear on this point, but his descriptions of occupational patterns seem
to indicate that the Chinese, pp. 228-29, Indians, p. 368, and Jews, pp. 306-07, were the classic
middleman minorities in almost all of their destination countries, while the Germans, p. 103,
and Japanese, p. 137, were more likely to concentrate initially in agriculture. The Italians, at
least in the United States, primarily entered the construction trades. Pp. 163-64.
8. In the German case, for example, he focuses on the German migrations to Russia, the
United States, Brazil, Paraguay, and Australia; the chapter on Indians develops their experi-
ence in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Guyana, Trinidad, the United States, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, and Fiji.
9. A comparison of economic patterns and achievements among the six groups would
have been an interesting and perhaps illuminating extension of his analysis, even if such a
comparison had to be confined, for methodological reasons, to an individual country like the
United States in which all groups reside in large numbers. Such a comparison might have
also provided an important comparative benchmark - (relative) economic failure - which
is missing from Sowell's account except insofar as he compares the economic performance of
each of the six groups to the sometimes inferior performance of the natives of the group's
destination countries. Unfortunately, however, he does not pursue this line of inquiry.
10. Sowell cites studies showing that over a period of 10 to 15 years, Black, White, and
Chinese migrants to the United States and to Canada and Britain have risen beyond parity
with the native populations. P. 38. A recent study comparing immigrant and native earnings
in the United States finds a mixed picture in which Japanese, Korean, and Chinese immi-
grants begin with wages much lower than native-born workers and reach parity with them
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considerable time to consolidate. What makes their progress even
more extraordinary is the fact that in almost every case, certain per-
sonal attributes that the groups brought to the destination country,
or the social conditions that they encountered there, posed enor-
mous obstacles to their progress, or even survival. The list of disad-
vantages is long: abject poverty and lack of skills,"' ignorance of
the native language, racial difference, disease, ethnic insularity,
harsh discrimination and sometimes violence at the hands of the
native population, limited opportunities to marry and form families,
and political exclusion. Often, moreover, they were also greeted by
unpromising material and economic conditions, sometimes even
less propitious than the ones from which they had so desperately
fled. In some cases, as with the Black Sea Germans, the Jews in
Germany and eastern Europe, and the Indians in some African
regions, the newcomers' economic vitality generated bitter hostility
from the native populations, forcing them to remigrate. Although
obliged to start over with many of the same disadvantages that they
encountered in their earlier migrations, these groups nevertheless
managed to replicate and even enlarge their success.
Sowell hopes to explain why these remarkable records of
accomplishment against long odds are so consistent within and, to
some extent, across these groups.12 As a methodological matter,
the global context of his study provides a provocative setting in
which to draw explanatory inferences. First, the six groups differed
enormously from one another with respect to race, language, reli-
gion, and other demographic variables, even including the gender
ratio of their migrating populations.'
3
Second, some of the countries of origin generated remarkably
diverse intragroup migrations. The Indian migrants, for example,
included Gujaratis who went primarily to Africa, Guyana, and Fiji
where they have dominated commerce; Tamils who settled in
Malaya and Ceylon where most worked as laborers; Chettyars who
went to other parts of Asia where they often dominated the
moneylending business; and Jains who took their diamond industry
skills overseas (pp. 311-12, 367-68).
Third, the groups' countries of origin were very different in
terms of their geophysical features - climate, soil, terrain, water
supply. The migrants had adapted to these features in their coun-
within 10 to 15 years, Europeans begin with comparable wages and remain at parity, and
Mexicans enter with very low wages and never catch up. See ROBERT F. SCHOENI ET AL-,
Tim MtxxD ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF IMMGRANTs at xiv (1996).
11. This was notably true of the Italians, who constituted perhaps the largest emigration
from a single country in history. Pp. 173-74.
12. He does not explicitly compare the six groups' levels of performance, but considers
each notably successful. See supra note 9.
13. See discussion of sex ratios infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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tries of origin by adopting patterns of occupation, agricultural prac-
tice, community life, diet, and dress that were peculiarly suited to
those countries. But the diversity among migrants in their original
conditions and cultures went well beyond the differences among the
countries from which they came. Even within countries of origin -
especially the immense land masses of China and India but also
within the smaller ones of Italy, Germany, and Japan - localities
exhibited their own distinctive geophysical conditions and cultural
patterns. Migrants from those localities brought those further vari-
ations with them to their new homes. As migrant streams often
flowed disproportionately from particular localities within each
country of origin,14 the migrants transplanted these intragroup dif-
ferences to the destination country.
Fourth, the destinations of the six groups differed. All of the
groups sent sizable cohorts to the United States and Australia, and
the groups overlapped to an extent in some other countries, but the
six migration streams established their own distinctive axes.15
Finally, the groups' migrations also occurred at different times,16
were prompted by different historical circumstances, and were
received differently by the native populations and by their
governments.' 7
This striking heterogeneity in the geographical and demographic
patterns of migration makes for an exceedingly complicated and
14. For example, Sowell observes that the Japanese migrants to Hawaii originated in dif-
ferent and poorer regions of Japan than those who migrated to the mainland United States.
P. 119. These local intracountry-of-origin differences in migration patterns were especially
important in Italy. For example, northern Italian migrants in the 1901-13 period, Sowell
reports, overwhelmingly went to European destinations while 91% of the southern Italians,
virtually all unskilled workers, crossed the Atlantic. Pp, 141, 143.
Within each country of origin, the geographical sources of migration were diverse but also
sometimes highly concentrated. For example, most Italian immigrants to Australia before
World War II came from relatively unpopulated areas of Italy; more than half of the Indian
migrants to the Middle East in 1979 came from Kerala state, which contained less than 3% of
India's population. P. 5. Of the pre-World War I Chinese immigrants to the United States, a
majority came from Toishan, just one of 98 districts in Kwangtung province. P. 177.
But the migration patterns were sometimes even more localized than this. Thus Sowell
reports that "rates of emigration varied enormously between very similar provinces and vil-
lages in Italy, even when they were located near each other, for one community might have
overseas contacts and the next community not." P. 145 (endnote omitted).
15. Sowell notes that more than 90% of all Japanese in the Western Hemisphere lived in
just two countries, Brazil and the United States, p. 113, and 90% of Jews in the world live in
just five countries, with nearly three-quarters of the total living in the United States and
Israel, p. 234.
16. The temporal dimension of migrant flows also affects their destinations, and these
shifts can be sharply discontinuous. Sowell observes that half of the Germans who left from
1816 to 1830 emigrated to South America, but after 1830 about 90% went to the United
States. P. 52.
17. For example, the Volga Germans were actively recruited and subsidized by Catherine
the Great, who hoped to use their settlements as models of efficient agriculture that the
Russian peasants might emulate. P. 59. They encountered great hostility, however, at the
local level. Pp. 59-60.
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potentially messy story. The great challenge for the analyst, then, is
to extract from this welter of diversity some general truths about
the determinants of the economic success and social integration of
outsider groups. Sowell's methodological strategy is to exploit the
fact, strongly established by his data, that some remarkable com-
monalities can be discerned within these evident differences. If
these six groups, so heterogeneous vis-A-vis one another and inter-
nally, nevertheless managed to achieve so much economic progress
despite such formidable obstacles in so many and varied venues,
their common success might provide important information bearing
on why ethnic groups perform as they do and why some do better
than others. At the very least, their common successes under such
disparate conditions would tend to cast doubt on some familiar
explanations of group differentials, particularly explanations that
emphasize conditions such as poverty, ignorance, hostility, and dis-
crimination, which all of these groups faced but still managed to
overcome in inhospitable country after inhospitable country.18 If
the analyst can also extract from this bewildering heterogeneity cer-
tain common cultural and behavioral patterns, and if he can then
link those patterns to the groups' economic successes, alternative
explanations of those successes - and perhaps of other groups'
failures' 9 - may emerge.
Such linkages, if firmly established, might even support prescrip-
tions for programmatic change. Sowell stresses, for example, a
strong theme in much of his earlier work: the folly and mischief of
judging the discriminatory character of a society or economy, as
some affirmative action advocates do, according to how different
groups are distributed in particular occupations. Skills, he main-
tains, are not randomly distributed in any one society, and they
hardly become more equally distributed when they are transported
across borders or oceans (p. 375).
[O]ne of the clearest facts to emerge from these worldwide histories
of various racial and ethnic groups is that gross statistical disparities in
the "representation" of groups in different occupations, industries,
income levels, and educational institutions have been the rule - not
the exception - all across the planet. Moreover, many of these dis-
parities have persisted for generations or even centuries.
20
18. "Virtually no wealthy people emigrated from India to Africa," Sowell reports, "even
though there have been Indians who acquired great wealth in various African countries." P.
313. Few of the Italians who emigrated to the western hemisphere possessed skills when they
arrived. P. 174.
19. I have already noted that the absence of analysis regarding group failures, in a study
focusing on group successes, constitutes an analytical failing of the book. See supra note 9.
20. Pp. 371-72. He adds that
[R]acial, ethnic, or national minorities who have owned or directed more than half of
particular industries in particular nations have included not only the six groups consid-
ered here but also the Lebanese in West Africa, Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, Britons
in Argentina, Belgians in Russia, and Spaniards in Chile.... Minority predominance in
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Disparities in achievement, he insists, can reflect differences in val-
ues and lifestyle,2 1 which in turn can be - indeed, must have been
- at some point in the past for all groups - self-consciously (or
group consciously) - cultivated or rejected. Thus, Sowell's analysis
may yield practical and policy payoffs as well as intellectual ones.
On the other hand, attempts to identify, explain, and influence
group differences are famously controversial, even incendiary.
Such efforts frequently generate allegations - some well-founded,
some not - of racism, sexism, or other invidious attitudes which
emphasize and exploit such differences. The bitter dispute over
studies purporting to establish the magnitude and sources of group-
specific differences in I.Q. is a cautionary tale,22 as is the ugly his-
tory of eugenics, a movement fueled largely by efforts to isolate and
stigmatize certain groups as inferior and to locate the root of their
inferiority in biological endowment.23 Where highly and almost
universally valued goals such as academic achievement and eco-
nomic success are concerned, observations about group disparities
are likely to be seen as normatively loaded assertions about which
groups or cultures are superior or inferior rather than simply as
descriptive statements about varied group preferences of the some-
like-chocolate, others-like-vanilla genre. Such analyses must there-
fore be undertaken with the utmost care and seriousness; at the
same time, punches should not be pulled. Migrations and Cultures
easily passes this test.
THE QUESTION OF CULTURE
Sowell maintains that the economic successes of migrant ethnic
groups are rooted in culture, and not in biology, environment, or
even history (pp. 375-77). He believes that certain ensembles of
values and practices constitute distinct cultures and that certain of
particular industries and occupations has been common at local levels as well. In the
early nineteenth century, over half the newspapers in Alexandria were owned by
Syrians. In the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, Armenians owned 209 of the
250 cotton cloth factories in the province of Astrakhan. Beginning in the 1960s, most of
the installers of underground cable in Sydney, Australia were Irish. In the 1990s, more
than four-fifths of all the doughnut shops in California were owned by people of
Cambodian ancestry.
P. 372 (endnotes omitted).
21. In support of this cultural capital hypothesis, Sowell cites evidence indicating that
Black-White differences in the United States in income and infant mortality rates decline or
disappear when one controls for important cultural variables. Pp. 382-83.
22. The firestorm of controversy that erupted over RICHARD J. HEIPRNSmIN & CHARLES
MURRAY, THE BELL CURvE (1994) is merely the most recent skirmish in a long war over the
meaning and use of I.Q. scores.
23. See generally DANIEL 3. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS (1985). For a recent
review of these arguments in the immigration context, see Dorothy Nelkin & Mark Michaels,
Biological Categories and Border Controls: The Revival of Eugenics in Anti-Immigration
Rhetoric 17 INTL. . OF SOCIOL. & So. POLY. (forthcoming Spring 1997).
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these cultures are more successful economically than others. Mem-
bers of groups in which those cultures already flourish may have
easier access to these values and practices, just as fluency in a par-
ticular language comes more readily to those who have been reared
in households where it is habitually spoken. But it is these values
and practices that conduce to economic success, not membership in
any ascriptively defined group.
The idea of culture, then, is utterly foundational in Sowell's
analysis. It is unfortunate, therefore, that this notion is also suspi-
ciously flexible, maddeningly ambiguous, and ultimately elusive.
He evidently conceives of the cultures that promote economic suc-
cess at a level of generality so abstract that they can include quite
different ways of life that quite different groups have crystallized in
quite different economic forms. Precisely such abstraction, of
course, is essential to his analytical project. After all, he is seeking
both to explain how certain ways of life are transformed as they are
carried to and transplanted in new environments, and also to iden-
tify the values and practices that animate those transformations.
He writes:
It is easy enough to understand how immigrants from an agricultural
background in the cold lands of Scandinavia would settle in agricul-
tural communities in the cold lands of Minnesota or Wisconsin, or
how Chettyar money-lenders from India would become money-lend-
ers in Burma or Malaya. What is more challenging is to understand
how unskilled workers from southern China would become retailers
throughout Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean and North America
.... [p. 8]
Cultures, he says, "cover a broad spectrum of human concerns,
from things as superficial as modes of dress to things as deeply felt
as what one is prepared to die for" (p. 379). Between these
extremes are the values and practices - the "human capital" - of
special interest to Sowell, the economist: meticulous work habits,
perseverance, social cohesion, law abidingness, risk taking, family
unity, future orientation, and the like?4
How do we know these precious cultural attributes when we see
them and how do we know that they exist in certain groups more
than others? These are important questions, given the subjectivity
of values and the ambiguous signification of practices. Sowell does
not really discuss these conceptual and methodological issues.
Instead, he employs three main indicia of cultural values and prac-
24. His list of cultural commitments is long and often quite specific. "Cultures differ," he
notes, "in the relative significance they attach to time, noise, safety, cleanliness, violence,
thrift, intellect, sex, and art. These differences in turn imply differences in social choices,
economic efficiency, and political stability." P. 379. He adds that "language and physical
appearance ... fertility patterns, technology, philosophy, social customs, and institutions of
government" will also vary by culture. P. 380.
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tices: groups' cultural reputations as reported by his mostly aca-
demic sources, descriptions of certain objective institutions and
practices that group members have established, and inferences
about cultural values that he draws from the fact of their economic
success in the face of obstacles. These indicia, of course, are merely
proxies (and crude ones at that) for the underlying phenomena that
are truly of interest to us, and such indicia beg a number of funda-
mental questions about evidence and causality. Still, if these data
and interpretations are not as rigorous as one might wish, they are
nonetheless highly plausible. We would be foolish to dismiss them
until we have something better.
What is the source of these cultural values and practices? What,
according to Sowell, made the southern Italians notably hard work-
ing and yet lacking in entrepreneurial initiative,25 while their coun-
trymen from the north were disproportionately successful as
entrepreneurs in the United States (pp. 164, 167)? Sowell ascribes
the southerners' industriousness to the exigencies of their hard-
scrabble life on unyielding soil in Italy; elsewhere he opines that
having brought few occupational skills with them they nevertheless
managed to exploit their "inner strength and inner values" (p. 174).
But where did these inner values come from, and why did the
northerners, on this theory, evidently possess them in even greater
degree?
Sowell does not advance a comprehensive theory of the forma-
tion and change of cultures; he simply asserts that they exist and
that they somehow persist over time and space. Yet how cultures
arise and then manage to endure are questions that both go to the
heart of his theory and lack self-evident answers. Indeed, the very
existence of a culture should puzzle an economist like Sowell. In
economic or evolutionary theory, of course, it is not difficult to
explain why some cultures endure while others decline. Some val-
ues and practices are more economically efficient, politically sus-
taining, militarily functional, and morally and spiritually fulfilling
than others. As such, they possess strong properties of survivability
when cultures clash and compete - as they inevitably do in trade,
migration, religious struggle, and war.
But again, what causes a culture to establish itself in the first
place? In the language of economic theory, after all, a culture is a
pure public good26 and a costly one at that. Until it takes hold and
becomes habitual, it requires of its practitioners much sacrifice -
25. Interestingly (and perhaps inconsistently), Sowell maintains that the Italians in
Argentina were far more entrepreneurial than their native-born counterparts, especially in
retailing. Pp. 152,154. He also cites the remarkable fact that the foreign-born owned 60% of
all the real estate in Buenos Aires earlier in this century. P. 154.
26. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. EcoN. &
STAT. 387 (1954) (defining public goods as goods that can be enjoyed in common such that
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time, self-discipline, imagination, and experimentation - without
any assurance that it will survive. However, those who wish to pro-
duce a public good like culture cannot appropriate its benefits for
themselves but must share them with free riders who will not bear
any of its costs. Since everyone would prefer to be a free rider, no
one wil make the investment necessary to produce and sustain the
culture.
All of this assumes rationality, of course, and one might say that
cultures are the very antithesis of rational products, arising instead
out of more opaque spiritual and psychological needs and the little-
understood processes that propel communal identity formation.
Sowell, however, does not make this move. Insofar as one can dis-
cern his implicit theory of culture, it seems largely materialist,
rationalist, and functionalist - fully in the spirit of economic the-
ory. Thus he emphasizes the value-shaping role of soil, climate,
topography, and water supply, and the rational, functional adapta-
tions of people to these geophysical factors as they develop their
occupational patterns and social mores.
Here, Sowell sometimes seeks to have it both ways. Thus, he
attributes both the meticulousness of the Japanese and the brute
physicality of the southern Italians to the poor agricultural condi-
tions in their homelands (pp. 111, 146). Nor can such geophysical
factors adequately explain the pronounced cultural differences that
sometimes persist between groups that live for long periods of time
in close proximity and material similarity to one another, such as
Native Americans and their immediate neighbors. And while he
mentions some striking instances in which cultures decline (he cites
Rome) or suddenly flourish (the Scottish Enlightenment of the late
eighteenth century), he fails to explain why these and other abrupt
reversals of cultural fate and effectiveness, despite apparent geo-
physical, normative, and habitual continuities, do not count as evi-
dence against his theory that culture - which is supposed to reflect
these continuities - drives performance (pp. 380-81). In the end,
then, he does not really dispel the deep and fascinating mystery
about the ultimate sources and economic consequences of culture.
Tm SELECTIVITY AND DIVERSITY OF MIGRATION
Migration, we know, is a highly selective process. Migrants are
not simply a random sample of the population in the country of
origin. Even before leaving their homeland, they are special, differ-
ing in a number of important respects from the demographically
similar people whom they leave behind. They also differ from the
one individual's consumption does not affect the amount of the good available to another
individual).
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migrants from other countries and from the natives of the countries
to which they go. After all, the mere fact that migrants are pre-
pared to uproot themselves, abandon all that is familiar (and some-
times familial), and trust that they can establish themselves in a
strange land and prosper there suggests that they are more auda-
cious, enterprising, self-confident, and risk taking than those who
stay at home. Migrants are seldom the most abjectly poor in the
country of origin; "[t]hose a notch or so higher on the economic
scale could more readily gather together the passage money and
might be a notch or so higher because they had more initiative or
more skills or experience."27 Nor do migrants always go from
poorer countries to wealthier ones; the more general pattern, exem-
plified by the German and Flemish migrants to eastern Europe, is
that migrants go to places, rich or poor, where they can be more
productive.28
If immigrants are already special before they migrate, their
experiences in the destination country make them even more so.
Those who migrate and later return to their countries of origin - a
significant fraction of all nonrefugee migrants29 - find themselves
to be even more different from the countrymen whom they left
behind than they were when they originally departed. In a sense,
they become aliens in their own countries, different not only in
their new skills and lifestyle but in ideas and values (pp. 22-25).
These differences can become so great that the returning migrants
feel a need to cluster with other returnees in enclaves that are quite
distinct from the surrounding society and that engender its resent-
ment (pp. 22 nn. 110 & 111, 145). Often, one supposes, those back
home welcome the remittances that migrants send back more than
the returning migrants themselves.30
The economic progress of those migrants who settle perma-
nently in the destination country does not necessarily ensure their
rapid integration into the larger society. One of Sowell's most
interesting findings is that some of the same social conditions that
27. Pp. 36-37. One might add that those at the very bottom are likely to lack the sense of
optimism required to undertake the arduous project of migration.
28. Pp. 42-43. This theory bears an interesting relationship to George Bojas's claim that
high-skill immigrants tend to move from areas of higher income equality to areas of lower
income equality (where their skills will yield a greater return) and that low-skill immigrants
move in the opposite direction (so that they will be less disadvantaged). See GEORGE J.
BoIUAs, FREmNDs OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMnoRANo s ON TmE U.S. ECONOMY 16-
18 (1990).
29. Sowell cites estimates that nearly 24 million of the 30 million people who left the
Indian subcontinent in the century after the mid-1830s returned and that 60% of the south-
ern Italian, Croatian, and Slovenian immigrants to the United States during the early 20th
century returned home. P. 25.
30. These remittances are immense and constitute major elements of the economies of
the countries of origin. Sowell reports some striking data on this. See, e.g., pp. 21-22, 114,
145.
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facilitate the group's economic success may also retard its assimila-
tion. Perhaps the most important factor promoting assimilation is
the rate at which the immigrant group marries members of the des-
tination society.31 This intermarriage rate is in turn powerfully
affected by the sex ratio of the migrants, which can vary considera-
bly even within a particular group going to the same country. For
Germans in the state of South Australia in the last half of the nine-
teenth century, he reports, there were almost as many female immi-
grants as male ones; as a consequence, they continued to marry
within the group and established isolated German-speaking
enclaves. In contrast, the sex ratio among German immigrants in
the state of Victoria was four males for each female, which resulted
in frequent intermarriage with non-Germans and relatively few eth-
nic enclaves. 32 The sex ratio among the Japanese in Brazil was
about 3:2 (p. 131), and almost all Japanese in Brazil came in family
groups (p. 131). In Brazil, the resulting high rate of in-group mar-
riages minimized the degree of the group's interaction and competi-
tion with the host society (p. 131). The remarkably insular Italian
marriage patterns in the United States represent another exam-
ple.33 In the short run, migrants' intermarriage with natives engen-
dered increased interaction, competition, and hostility toward
migrants in the host society; in the long run, however, it surely pro-
moted assimilation and the attenuation of ethnic identities.
Like a person rummaging through a fine antique store, the
reader of Sowell's account of migrations can hardly avoid coming
across some interesting but unexpected miscellany. Many claims
are surprising only because they reflect a comparative perspective
often lacking in even the most thoughtful commentators on immi-
gration. Examples include his claims that: the World War II intern-
ment of Japanese civilians was "an even bigger disaster... in
Canada than in the U.S." (p. 123); that German prejudice against
Jews and other groups historically "tended to be less rather than
more prevalent, as compared to other Europeans - or to Asians or
Africans, for that matter" (p. 103); that the prejudice against the
Chinese has been greater and more violent in Asia than elsewhere
(p. 227); and that the Japanese communities in the United States
31. Even today, barriers to intermarriage also exist within some of the immigrant groups,
such as Indians, along the lines of language or religion. See p. 332. Sowell notes, however,
that caste lines among migrating Indians became less important in some destination countries
like Guyana, Trinidad, and Malaysia. Pp. 333, 349. Interestingly, he relates the differential
survival of caste distinctions in various destination countries to the length of the voyage
there, which compromised the physical separation on which such distinctions rely. P. 351.
32. Pp. 95-96. The most extreme male imbalance may have been among the Chinese in
the United States during the late nineteenth century when the sex ratio reached 27:1. As a
result, the Chinese population steadily declined. Pp. 220-21.
33. Sowell reports that 97% of Italian men in 1920 were married to Italian wives and that
even as late as 1950 this was still true of more than three-quarters of them. P. 162.
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during World War II felt much greater loyalty to the United States
than those in Brazil felt to Brazil, despite being subjected to harsher
treatment here (p. 107). Some of his data are shocking and must
indelibly alter our images of earlier migrations. He notes, for
example, that seventeen percent of the immigrants on ships bound
for th6 United States during the mid-nineteenth century died either
on the way or on arrival (p. 39), a mortality rate that begins to
approach even the ghastly toll of the "middle passage" voyages of
the slave trade.34
DISCRIMINATION AND IMMIGRANT SUCCESS
At a time when all immigrant-receiving countries - other than
the United States - are accepting fewer legal immigrants, it is
worthwhile to consider how government policies toward immigra-
tion have evolved. Some countries once welcomed and even subsi-
dized immigrants, recognizing their potential for spurring economic
development. The Czars, for example, invested heavily in creating
settlements for the Volga Germans whom they hoped would serve
as agrarian models for their own, more backward subjects (p. 59).
Brazil, like many American states in the nineteenth century, also
subsidized immigrants whom they hoped would settle and develop
their vast frontiers (p. 156). But it is dismaying to observe how
even national economic self-interest often yielded to xenophobia,
as governments initiated, or capitulated to, the most repressive poli-
cies excluding, harassing, exploiting, expelling, and killing even
their most productive immigrants.35
Some immigrant groups were resilient enough to survive even
the harshest forms of discrimination. Sowell reports, for example,
that although the internment of the Japanese in the United States
reduced the internees' income in the immediate post-war years,
they achieved economic parity with Americans by 1959; in Canada,
where the internments were even more damaging economically,
their rebound was "spectacular" (pp. 118, 124). The growing social
acceptance of the Japanese after their internments in countries as
disparate as Peru, Australia, and the United States was also stun-
ning (p. 139). In 1959, only sixteen years after the repeal of the
34. Upper estimates of mortality rates during the middle passage approach thirty percent.
See HERBERT S. KLEIN, .THE MIDDLE PASSAGE: CoMPARATIvE STUDIEs IN THE ALAtr-c
SLAVE TRADE 137, 265-68 (1978); see also DAVID ELms, ECONoMic GRoWvrH AND THM
ENDING OF THE TRANsATiANTc SLAVE TRADE (1987).
35. Sowell mentions as examples the expulsions of Jews from medieval Europe, Indian
Chettyars from Burma, Moriscoes from Spain, and Indians and Pakistanis from Uganda. P.
46. I have already mentioned the Japanese internments in the United States, some of which
were initiated by Latin American countries (although not Brazil) that sent their Japanese
residents to the United States for internment. See p. 134.
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virulently racist Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese family income in
the United States approximated the national average (p. 226).
What are we to make of these remarkable triumphs of so manyimmigrant groups in so many unwelcoming societies? Could it be
that anti-immigrant animus, which so cruelly and perversely disad-
vantaged these groups in the short run, actually strengthened their
economic and often social positions in the long run? In some para-
doxical way, might hostility and discrimination promote the survival
and prosperity of the very group (if not always of each member)
that they hope to exclude?
This is an intriguing question. Given the fact that most if not all
destination countries today display xenophobic attitudes and poli-
cies, 36 it is also an extremely timely and relevant one. To ask it, of
course, is emphatically not to countenance discrimination, which
inflicts undeserved suffering on innocent, admirable people.37
Instead, such a question invites us to consider the subtle dynamics
of immigrants' progress, to reconsider some long-held assumptions,
and to wonder anew at the strength of the human spirit and the
persistence of coherent cultures under conditions of extreme adver-
sity. It is to this question that I devote the remainder of this review.
Before considering how discrimination might paradoxically
work to the eventual advantage of a victimized immigrant group
(although not to all individual members), one should recognize
three important complications that Sowell does not, and perhaps
cannot, adequately explain. First, not all immigrants' stories have
happy endings; indeed, many do not, at least if we look only at the
first generation - the immigrant himself. I previously noted that
Sowell's data reveal the immense return migration flows exper-
ienced by some groups.38 He suggests that many of these returnees
succeeded as immigrants and came home as wealthy men. We must
assume, however, that many, perhaps even most, of the returnees
did not fulfill the dreams that had impelled them to migrate and
many of these came home to resume the limited opportunities that
they had hoped to escape.
Second, Sowell's data, while impressive in their range and
depth, are necessarily limited to the six ethnic and national groups
36. For a crude taxonomy of restrictionist attitudes, including xenophobia, see Peter H.
Schuck, The Treatment of Aliens in the United States, in PATHS TO INCLUSION: Ti- INTEGRA-
TON OF MIGRANTS iN TmE UNmTED STATES AND GERMANY (Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Munz
eds., forthcoming 1997). For another account of xenophobia, see Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens
as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection
Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1425 (1995).
37. That discrimination often also redounds, with a just perversity, to the perpetrators'
disadvantage by depriving them of the benefits of the immigrants' skills provides but cold
comfort to the victims.
38. See supra note 29.
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that he describes. Although their diasporas were quite large (espe-
cially the Chinese and Indians), they do not begin to include all of
the great migrations in recent history. The representativeness of his
data, then, remains uncertain. They exclude, for example, the out-
flows from the Arabian peninsula, many Asian migrants, groups
from the Mahgreb and sub-Saharan Africa, those from eastern
Europe (other than the primary migration of Jews and the secon-
dary migration of Germans), and the immense flows north from the
Caribbean and South and Central America. Some of the groups
that Sowell canvasses have been more successful than others; so too
have some of the groups that he does not include.39
Third and most important, the diverse immigration experiences
within Sowell's six groups cast considerable doubt on the adequacy
of his cultural explanation for group successes abroad. As noted
earlier, he attributes these differences in economic performance
largely to the premigration variations in local cultures, habits, skills,
economic opportunities, and physical resources that divided each
group in its country (or in the case of Jews, countries) of origin. To
be sure, he does mention some of the postmigration conditions -
economic geography, local attitudes toward migrants, the availabil-
ity of market niches, demographic pressures for intermarriage, and
so on - that greeted each diaspora's subgroups as they settled in
different destination communities and countries. He maintains that
these conditions, together with the traditions and values the group's
members carried with them, shaped their experiences in their new
homelands. But if these conditions contributed to their success in
the destination countries as well, then it was not the group's
premigration culture (as Sowell would have it) that explains their
success but rather some unspecified, perhaps indeterminate, combi-
nation of pre- and postmigration factors.
It seems almost self-evident that any persuasive theory purport-
ing to explain differential success among immigrant groups would
have to take account of such a combination of pre- and postmigra-
tion factors. After all, how else are we to explain the fact that
immigrant groups that have succeeded in the United States and
Canada have fared relatively poorly in some of their other destina-
tion countries? A leading migration scholar, Myron Weiner, makes
the point cogently:
Second-generation Arabs and Turks appear to be doing better in the
United States than they are in France and Germany. Culture in these
cases is presumably the same, yet the outcomes differ. The ease with
which citizenship is acquired, the acceptance of cultural and religious
39. 'The same mixed picture was provided by the most widely read earlier work compar-
ing the progress of different immigrant groups in the United States. See NATHAN GLAZER &
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTINO POT: THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS,
JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CrY (1970).
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diversity by the host population, and educational opportunities may
be factors in explaining the differences. 40
In short, an immigrant group's performance may be powerfully
shaped by its values, habits, and skills, but those factors are inevita-
bly mediated by more external, less controllable factors such as
legal and political institutions and the attitudes and behavior of
inhabitants in the destination country.
Sowell would surely not deny the importance of these external
factors. After all, if a group's culture is powerfully influenced by
the geophysical and institutional conditions in its country of origin,
as he insists, then it can hardly be doubted that the same kinds of
factors would influence the group's success in the destination coun-
try. Nevertheless, Sowell makes a problematic choice in his selec-
tive theoretical account: he emphasizes group culture as the crucial
intervening variable between those conditions in the country of ori-
gin and the group's performance in the destination country, but
then fails to incorporate the destination country's institutional and
attitudinal variables into his causal theory. He wants to insist on
the explanatory power of a single factor - albeit one, as we saw,
that is diffusely defined - that social scientists (not to speak of
more careless commentators) too often neglect. By doing so, how-
ever, he forgoes the opportunity to incorporate other factors into
his theory - factors that would produce a less striking and origi-
nal41 but more comprehensive and ultimately persuasive account ofimmigrants' diverse experiences.
Invidious discrimination, as Sowell painstakingly demonstrates,
is an important part of those experiences in almost all cases. Even
when the host government welcomed immigrants, as in the case of
Czarist Russia and the Volga Germans, the populace tended to
receive them with hostility and recrimination. 42 The great puzzle is
to understand why this discrimination did not in the end defeat the
efforts of the newcomers to prosper and assimilate. An answer
might be of great value to contemporary immigrant groups and eth-
nic minorities that must devise strategies for dealing with the con-
tinuing animus that their presence arouses in almost all societies.
40. Myron Weiner, Nations Without Borders: The Gifts of Folk Gone Abroad, 75
FORmGN Ars. 128, 131-32 (1996) (reviewing MIGRAaONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD
VImw).
41. Originality, of course, is a matter of degree. Sowell's emphasis on the distinctive
characters and cultures of groups, on the geophysical origins of these differences, and on
their behavioral effects has many illustrious antecedents. See 1 & 2 BARON DE
MoN'Esoumu, THm Spmnrr OF LAWS (Special Edition 1984); BERNARD BAILYN, T-m
PEOPUING OF BRrTSH NORTH AMERICA: AN INTRODUCriON (1986); THOMAS JEFFERSON,
NOTs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1995).
42. See supra note 17.
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IMMIGRANTS IN POLITICS AND MARKETS
Sowell offers a solution, and it is one that will seem counter-
intuitive, perhaps even subversive, to many readers. I also suspect
that it will particularly offend those who actively advocate the
group interests of immigrants and minorities in the public domain.
Sowell believes that immigrants' interests are best advanced not
through political action but through successful participation in the
market. Paradoxically, discrimination can promote economically
functional behavior by immigrants. Because they are excluded by
the majority from ethnic preferences in certain politicized sectors of
the economy, they may redouble their efforts to acquire education
and economic skills that will make such preferences unnecessary.
They may also gravitate to other less politicized sectors where they
face reduced competition and can accumulate enduring advan-
tages.43 Deprived of opportunities in the extractive or manufactur-
ing industries or as corporate employees, they may gain expertise in
the middleman functions so vital to modem economies and in the
professions where potentially lucrative self-employment and inde-
pendence beckon.44 Thrown back by discrimination on their own
resources, they may rely upon family members and community ties
which can entail economic efficiencies.
Sowell explains the dramatic decline in virulent anti-Japanese
discrimination thus: "behavior and performance are more effective
ways of changing other people's minds than moral crusades or emo-
tional denunciations" (p. 139). But the social consequences of a
group's success are more convoluted and remorselessly perverse
than this pollyannish lesson suggests. Indeed, as Sowell shows else-
where in this book and as others have also shown, a group's eco-
nomic success has often heightened, rather than reduced, such
hostility.45 Indeed, he himself reports that the Chinese have
aroused more hostility than other immigrant and minority groups
that are much more prosperous than the Chinese (p. 228), that Jew-
ish achievements have magnified anti-Semitism everywhere, indeed
particularly "in those societies most desperately in need of the spe-
cial skills of Jews" (p. 307), and that the economic success of the
Tamils in Ceylon has engendered bitter hostility and discrimination
by the native Sinhalese (p. 354). Surely then the larger truth, which
Sowell's evidence supports but his tendentiousness obscures, is that
both responses to immigrant success, admiration and animus, can
43. This has been the experience of the Chinese in Malaysia, for example. See p. 197. On
the other hand, many Chinese entrepreneurs have evaded these preference restrictions by
employing Malay fronts in so-called "Ali-Baba" enterprises. P. 196.
44. See discussion of middleman functions, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 223, passim (1995).
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coexist; indeed, they can and do coexist at the same time, in the
same society, even in the same individual.
46
As a well-known neo-conservative economist, Sowell's prefer-
ence for market-based solutions to social problems hardly comes as
a shock. Even so, the historical evidence that he adduces on the
relationship between immigrant groups' economic progress in the
destination countries and their lack of involvement in the politics of
those countries is provocative. He reports that in destination coun-
try after destination country, economic assimilation of the group
precedes its acquisition of political influence, not the other way
around. The most prosperous immigrant groups, he states, have not
advanced themselves through ethnic group politics; their political
activity has occurred after they gained economic power.47
An aversion to politics in the destination countries would not be
surprising. After all, these groups originated in societies governed
by nonparticipatory or repressive regimes; hence they bore with
them no tradition of organized pluralistic politics even when they
migrated to relatively participatory societies. Moreover, none of
these groups, with the exception of the Chinese in Malaysia, consti-
tuted a large enough fraction of their new society for ethnic group
solidarity to seem like a viable strategy for political success.48
Indeed, group-based political action would carry grave risks of bit-
ter retaliation by the dominant ethnic groups. 49 Finally, it was often
the public sector that most actively excluded immigrant groups, as
South Africa did with respect to Indians (pp. 330-31).
Where members of immigrant groups have played prominent or
leadership roles in politics - for example, Germans and Italians in
the United States, Jews in Australia, and Japanese in Peru - they
have almost always done so, Sowell claims, as otherwise-
established, economically independent individuals rather than as
46. Sowell reports that "Itihe Chinese in Indonesia have long been considered the most
assimilated Chinese community in Southeast Asia but this has not prevented them from
being also the most repeatedly and violently attacked." P. 205. He also notes that despite
the economic success of the Chinese in Indochina, an estimated 70% of the one million refu-
gees who left Vietnam in the late 1970s were Chinese, and half of Kampuchea's Chinese
population of 400,000 were killed during this period. Pp. 212-13.
47. Sowell ascribes this pattern to the immigrant Germans in the United States and in
Australia, pp. 79, 97, the Japanese in Canada and Peru, pp. 124-25, 128, 137, the Italians in
Argentina and elsewhere, p. 155, and the Jews and the Chinese almost everywhere, p. 218.
On the other hand, some of his data seem inconsistent with this pattern. He notes, for exam-
ple, that the overseas Chinese were disproportionately active in union and Communist move-
ments in Southeast Asia and that the same was famously true of Jewish immigrants. P. 190.
He also traces Indian political activism in Kenya. Pp. 325-26.
48. Even in New York City at the height of their migration there, the Italians constituted
only 7.4% of the population. P. 161.
49. Chinese immigrants have experienced such recrimination throughout southeast Asia.
Pp. 181-213. Indians suffered at the hands of independence movements both in Africa,
where they had supported such movements, p. 326, and in Ceylon, where they had remained
aloof from politics, pp. 356-58.
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ethnic group activists or representatives. 50 Many immigrants, of
course, participated in political organizations in which ethnic soli-
darity was viewed as an important electoral asset, as in the
"machine" organizations that dominated the governments of some
American cities. Typically, however, these ethnic groups joined
such organizations as elements of larger, multiethnic and tran-
sethnic coalitions in which the dominant incentives for action were
individual material benefits, not group-oriented programmatic
goals and public goods. Moreover, as Sowell and others have
argued, those groups, such as the Irish in the United States, that
managed to gain political patronage and public sector jobs through
such organizations paid a high price for their political success,
though one not noticed at the time. They were slower to achieve
market power, economic independence, and social assimilation
than those groups that eschewed politics for private sector rewards
by focusing their energies on the cultivation of entrepreneurial,
market-oriented skills.5'
Again, this tradeoff is not surprising. All individuals, whether
native born or immigrants, must make an ensemble of strategic
decisions about how they will invest their scarce resources. Com-
pared with the native born, immigrants have ordinarily been more
constrained in their choices because they traditionally entered their
new society with more limited resources.52 Their most important
choice, like that of all individuals, is whether to invest in present
and near-term rewards or instead to sacrifice those rewards in the
hope of longer-term returns. This choice in turn leads to other,
more specific ones - between investing in themselves or in their
families; between immediate employment or education; between
consumption and saving; between cultural insularity or assimilation;
between learning the new language rapidly or more slowly; between
50. Sowell points out, for example, that Fiorello LaGuardia, the popular mayor of New
York City for more than a decade, failed to carry the Italian vote in his 1941 re-election
campaign against an Irish opponent. P. 166. This single example, of course, hardly estab-
lishes Sowell's claim; indeed, many contrary cases in which ethnic solidarity at the polls was
decisive could readily be cited. See, eg., DONALD L. HoRowrrz, ETHNIc GROUPS IN
CoNFucr passim (1985).
51. Pp. 232-33. To support this claim, Sowell points to the Chinese experience: in coun-
tries (like Indonesia) where this generally apolitical group was more politically active, it did
not seem to do better. Pp. 205-06. Without more, however, this assertion is hardly persua-
sive, as it does not consider the possibility that the Chinese, absent their political action,
would have done even worse. Still, there is much to be said for Sowell's general claim, and
other commentators have concurred in it. See BoRAs, supra note 28; GLAZER &
MoYNniAN, supra note 39.
52. I say "traditionally" because the immigration policies adopted by those relatively few
destination countries that now accept immigrants on a normal flow basis have increasingly
tended to require immigrants to possess levels of education, occupational skill, language, or
wealth that may already rival or exceed those of the native-born population. At the very
least, these requirements will enable new immigrants to achieve parity within a relatively
short time. See SCHOENI Er AL, supra note 10.
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pursuing individual goals or group goals; between public sector and
private sector occupations. In reality, of course, such choices are
not always quite as stark as I have presented them; for example,
immigrants may work full time and go to school, and they may
retain their cultures of origin while also seeking to learn new folk-
ways. Inevitably, however, their tradeoffs are difficult and poign-
ant. They must choose, and their choices, on average, will have far-
reaching consequences for them and their families. The aggregate
of such choices will significantly affect the future of their group and
of their new society.
IMMIGRANT ASSIMILATION
Sowell's evidence strongly suggests that the most economically
successful immigrant groups have chosen to devote their energies
and resources primarily to the pursuit of relatively future-oriented,
family-oriented, market-oriented, assimilationist, apolitical, and
individualistic strategies of economic and social advancement.
Of these strategies, assimilation seems the most elusive; its defi-
nition is ambiguous and its preconditions are both temporally and
behaviorally uncertain.5 3 The terms of trade between the immi-
grant's retention of his traditional culture (even as he transforms it
under the influence of the destination society) and his induction
into, and acceptance by, the new are under constant negotiation.5 4
Even the effects of assimilation on group survival are not clear cut;
as Sowell reminds us, the degree of Jewish assimilation had little
effect on their ultimate fate during the Holocaust; they were more
fully integrated into German and Polish society than elsewhere in
Europe, yet they suffered annihilating losses there as well as in
countries like the Soviet Union where they were less assimilated
(pp. 267-70).
Even for the stunningly successful groups that Sowell presents,
for example, the pace of assimilation has varied among and within
different immigrant groups over time and place according to demo-
graphic factors (for example, sex ratio) that affect intermarriage
rates, geophysical and cultural insularity, popular hostility, and
other conditions. Moreover, some behaviors that can retard assimi-
lation in the short run may foster it in the longer term. Sowell
notes, for example, that the Japanese in Brazil, like other upwardly
mobile but slow-to-assimilate groups, advanced largely through
53. A vast literature exists on the subject. The classic study in the U.S. context is MILTON
M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERmcAN LuF (1964). For recent analyses of the subject in
the U.S. and German contexts, see PATHS TO INCLUSION, supra note 36.
54. These creative and destructive tensions are, of course, the sources of great literary
and artistic creations in every immigrant society.
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self-employment.5 5 George Borjas, a labor economist who special-
izes in immigration, argues that the traditional immigrants' strategy
of exploiting ethnic market niches such as specialized restaurants
and retailing, a strategy that is usually viewed as promoting eco-
nomic skills, entrepreneurship, and assimilation, has its darker side.
Such a strategy, he suggests, may consign immigrants to their ethni-
cally defined enclaves, making it more difficult for them to break
out and compete in larger, more cosmopolitan markets in which
scale economies and new products, services, and skills are rewarded
(p. 137). On the other hand, sociologists of immigration like
Alejandro Portes emphasize that communal insularity, while delay-
ing full assimilation, may nevertheless create a vital breathing space
for the immigrants' children, the crucial second generation. This
allows these children to learn the lafiguage and essential norms of
mainstream society while at the same time rejecting, under the
intense cultural tutelage of their immigrant parents, the more
destructive, adversarial native subcultures that surround and
threaten to seduce them.5 6
Sowell's theory and data cannot resolve these somewhat com-
peting claims about assimilation any more than they can rigorously
differentiate the interrelated roles of immigrant values and skills,
geophysical and demographic factors, and destination country insti-
tutions and receptiveness in shaping the fates of immigrant groups.
But in underscoring both the primacy of individual economic
achievement in the social progress of groups and the relative insig-
nificance of ethnic politics to that progress, he turns on its head
much of the conventional wisdom among ethnic group leaders in
the United States and elsewhere. In this respect, Sowell heightens
the relevance of the work of social scientists - work that he does
not cite - who are skeptical about the tenor and effectiveness of
modem ethnic politics, especially in the United States. In contrast
to those who view ethnic and pan-ethnic appeals as providing a
solid grounding for the advancement of immigrants' interests,5 7
these skeptics argue that contemporary minority group politics
tends to emphasize the rhetoric of protest, symbolism, and separa-
tism at the cost of strong political organization, accountable leader-
ship, broad coalition building, sound policies, and real economic
55. See BoPiAS, supra note 28, at 169-76.
56. See Alejandro Portes, Children of Immigrants: Segmented Assimilation and Its
Determinants, in THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION: ESSAYS ON NETWORKS,
ETmNcrrY, AND ENTRER~anutsImp 248, 250-51 (Alejandro Portes ed., 1995).
57. See eg., YN Ln Esp'mrru, Asi, AMERicAN PANmaNIcrrY: BRmoINo INSTrrU.
TIONS AND IDENTITIEs (1992); BILL ONG HING, MAKrNG Am REMAKING AsIAN AMERICA
THRoUGH IMMIGRATION POUCY 1850-1990 (1993).
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gains.58 In their view - and in Sowell's - such a politics consti-
tutes a model for acceptance that upwardly mobile immigrants
should not emulate. At best, in this view, it distracts them from
their vital need to acquire individual economic skills, construct
durable communities, and adopt social identities and linkages
firmly anchored in the American mainstream. At worst, it encour-
ages them to adopt ideological styles and agendas that can help to
generate the kind of harsh, backlash politics that in 1996 produced
the most xenophobic spate of legislation in more than four
decades.5 9
THE FuTuRE OF IMMIGRATION POLICY
Sowell says little about the present and future of immigration
policy, yet his subject - the migration of cultures - is so central to
the immigration debate that he cannot help but offer some general
advice. Migrating cultures compete with those that they encounter
in their diasporas, and the competition proceeds at many levels -
economic, military, religious, linguistic, technological, ideological,
aesthetic, normative, physiological, and even bacteriological.
Often, the immigrants demand or evoke responses from the domi-
nant culture of the receiving country. In some cases - he mentions
affirmative action and multicultural policies in the United States,
Canada, and Australia - the demands for change may come less
from the immigrants than from the natives, and they may increase
the costs of absorbing immigrants, including the level of natives'
hostility (p. 387).
After noting that immigration has both positive and negative
consequences for the receiving country depending on the cultures
that the immigrants carry with them, Sowell makes two acute, inter-
esting observations. First, "domestic ideological agendas may make
it impossible to be selective in admitting immigrants from different
nations, leaving as alternatives only loss of control of the borders or
restrictive policies toward immigrants in general" (p. 388). This
seems a fair characterization of the way in which Congress has per-
ceived the politics of immigration in the United States and explains
much of the harshness of the 1996 legislation.60 Second, after not-
ing that formal schooling and desirable human capital are not the
same, he states that "the transportation of bodies and the dissemi-
58. See, eg., PEMTR SKERRY, MEXCAN-AmucANs: Tim AMznrvALnrT MINoR=y
(1993); JAMES Q. WILSON, NEORO PoLrrcs (1960).
59. See the immigration provisions of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,110 Stat. 3009; the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1215; and the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-103, 110 Stat. 55.
60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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nation of human capital have become increasingly separable opera-
tions, so that the historic role of immigration in advancing nations
need not apply to its future role.... Neither technological nor man-
agerial human capital requires mass immigration for its diffusion"
(pp. 389-90). Whether other forms of human capital such as "can-
do" optimism and energy, a strong work ethic, future orientation,
religious piety, traditional family values, and faith in education and
in America do in fact require - and justify - continued immigra-
tion he does not say. It remains, however, a crucial question for
American public debate.
The future of American immigration policy, and indeed the
future course of American society more generally, may well depend
on which prescription for immigrant progress - Sowell's individu-
alistic, apolitical, market-oriented strategy of human and social cap-
ital accumulation, or the politics of ethnic protest advocated by
many minority group leaders- gains the allegiance of the large
number of recently arrived and future immigrants. If past is pro-
logue, the vast majority of them will continue to follow Sowell's
preferred path to full membership in American society. In that pro-
cess, they will - often with some sense of loss - gradually attenu-
ate, transform, and shed their ethnic group identities.
But past is not always prologue. Indeed, it is not even past;
instead, it survives to help shape the future. The experiences of
recent immigrants to the United States are almost certainly more
diverse than at any other time in American history, if only because
our immigration stream is now more diverse than ever before in
national origins, linguistic, racial, cultural, and relative educational
and skill-level terms. This kaleidoscopic range of experiences and
perspectives, which have served us well in the past, provides much
reason for optimism about immigration; it also gives some ground
for fresh concern.61 Only time will tell whether the optimism or the
concerns are borne out. In the meanwhile, the perennially stirring,
compelling drama of individual and cultural migration continues.
61. For a recent effort to capture this mixed picture, see Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumina-
tion, 105 YALE IJ. 1963 (1996) (reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, AUEEN NATION (1995)).
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